




Pragmatists recommend that in approaching a problematic concept, philoso-
phers should begin by examining the role of the concept concerned in the prac-
tical, cognitive and linguistic life of the creatures who use it. I’m interested in
pragmatic accounts, in this sense, of the various modal notions we encounter
in science—causation, probability, counterfactual conditionals, and so on. In
this paper, I want to propose that these accounts should avail themselves of the
vocabulary of theoretical models.
Although my concern is thus with the application of models to the study of
modals in general, I have a special interest in the case of causation. In previous
work, I’ve defended an ‘agency’ or ‘manipulability’ approach to causation. This
approach links our possession of causal concepts to the fact that we are agents.
In the version that I prefer, it is a pragmatic account, in the above sense. (It
is also a perspectival account, in a sense I’ll be trying to clarify further below.)
Some writers (e.g., Pearl 2000, Woodward 2001) agree about the centrality of
notions of agency and manipulation to an understanding of causation, but take
the resulting view in a more realist or objectivist spirit. From my point of view,
then, there are two groups of opponents—those who need convincing about the
centrality of agency and manipulation in an account of causation in the first
place, and those who need convincing only about the pragmatic or perspectival
character of the best such account. In both cases, however, a pressing task is
to clarify the perspectival option. That’s what I’ll be attempting here, with the
aid of theoretical models.
Clarifying the perspectival option is a matter of locating it on philosophical
maps—or, in some cases, redrawing the maps so as not to exclude it by default.
Philosophers have a tendency to think of the question ‘Is there any such thing
as causation?’ as on all fours with ‘Are there any Tasmanian tigers?’ or ‘Are
there magnetic monopoles?’ This has the effect of simply excluding some views
of causation, views according to which there are important differences between
the question about causation and the questions raised by physics and natural
history.
As an example of someone who appears to be missing the relevant possibility,
consider this famous remark from Bertrand Russell:
∗Forthcoming in Donald Gillies, ed., Laws and Models in Science, King’s College Publi-
cations, 2004.
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All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the
fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in
advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause’
never occurs . . . The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes
muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving,
like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no
harm. (Russell, 1913)
Russell seems to be arguing that physics has shown us that there is no such
thing as causation—a discovery about what the world contains, apparently, on
a par with those of natural history and physics itself. But I want to show that
there’s an important option that Russell thus overlooks. Extending Russell’s
own metaphor, I’ll call it causal republicanism.
Consider the political case. When we reject the view that political authority
is vested in our rulers by god, we have two choices. We can reject the notion of
political authority altogether, or we can regard it, as republicans do, as vested
in our rulers by us. The republican option exists in metaphysics, too, where it
is an alternative to realism and eliminativism. In the case of causation, it is the
view that although notions of causal power are useful, perhaps indispensable, in
our dealings with the world, they are a category constructed by us, not provided
by God.
In comparing causation dismissively to the monarchy, Russell seems largely
blind to this republican possibility—a failing he shares, I think, with many of his
realist opponents. In my view, thinking of eliminativism as the sole alternative
to causal realism is like thinking of anarchy as the sole alternative to the divine
right of kings. Thus I agree with Russell in rejecting a certain kind of realism
about causation, but disagree about the relevance to this conclusion of the issue
of the eliminability of causal notions from physics. For a republican, causation
may turn out to be both ineliminable and anthropocentric. In my view, the
best versions of the agency approach give causation this republican flavour.
As I noted above, my interest in agency accounts of causation is part of a
broader concern with pragmatic approaches to the various modalities employed
in science. There are deep connections among the modal notions, I think, and
hence much to be learnt by considering them as a group. More importantly for
present purposes, the points I want to make are more easily made for probability
than for causation, the relevant landscape being simpler and better-known. In
particular, there’s a familiar debate about the relevance of physics to the ques-
tion as to whether there are (non-trivial) chances or objective probabilities—in
some ways, a probabilistic analogue of the issue raised by Russell. I think that
that debate, too, often misses important parts of the landscape. But it’s easier
to explain why than for causation directly, because the landscape is so familiar.
Dialectically, then, it makes sense to begin with probability.
Most of the paper will thus be concerned with probability. In the next
section, I’ll distinguish three conceptions of what we are doing in modelling
probabilities. There are two aspects of this approach to flag at this stage, the
first the three-way distinction itself, and the second the fact that it is couched
in terms of the functions of theoretical models. The relevance of the three-
way distinction is that one of these three conceptions is easily overlooked, and
yet crucial, in my view, both in deciding what’s right and what’s wrong about
Russell’s claim, and in understanding the nature of modal perspectivalism.
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As for the focus on models, I’ve said that I’m trying to call attention to,
and clarify, a kind of pragmatic perspectivalism about modal notions. It would
be possible to do this by talking about the functions of theoretical language.
Expressed this way, however, the concerns of pragmatism and realism are apt
to seem orthogonal. Pragmatists focus on language, realists on reality, and the
two sides can easily seem to be talking past one another. Focussing on models
makes it easier to find common ground. As we’ll see, the kinds of things a modal
pragmatist wants to say find natural expression as theses about the functions of
models (for creatures in our situation). While on the realist side, issues about
the use and role of theoretical models are already sufficiently in play to present
the questions the pragmatist wants to raise as ‘more of the same’. The result,
hopefully, is a more accessible and more ‘scientific’ modal pragmatism—and a
pragmatism with a less linguistic face, via models with a more human face.1
2 Probability—models and meta-models
Let’s begin, then, with a question about probabilistic models. What are we
modelling when model probabilities? Or, more neutrally, what is the function
of probabilitistic models—what do we use them for?
I want to distinguish three different conceptions of the role of probabilistic
models, especially in science. In each case, I want to be able to think about the
relation of the models in question to the needs and characteristics of the users of
those models. I want to be able to consider the relevance of variations in char-
acteristics of the users, to the utility and possibility of their use of probabilistic
models, under particular conceptions of what those models involve. In order to
think about these issues in the abstract, idealised way typical in science, I want
to be able to model them. So I’ll need what I’ll call meta-models—models of the
users of probabilistic models. Here, then, are three possible views of the func-
tions of probabilistic models, together with some remarks about the associated
meta-models.
2.1 Objectivist models
On this view our aim in modelling probabilities is to model an aspect of the
(modeller-independent) physical world. Probability is regarded as an aspect of
the objective world, on a par with other features studied by physics. There
are different views about what such objective probabilities are, of course. The
options include propensities, hypothetical limiting frequencies of various kinds,
and theoretical entities, not further specified, but picked out in virtue of their
relevance to our decision-theoretic psychology—that aspect of the world, knowl-
edge of which makes rational certain degrees of belief.
If probabilistic models are understood in this objectivist way, what can we
1One important aspect of this shift from language to models is that it helps to distance
us from na¨ıvely representational conceptions of the role of theoretical language in science.
Pragmatists are often foes of representationalism. While theoretical models are not in-
evitably conceived in anti-representational terms, it is uncontroversial that they can have
non-representational functions (see, e. g., Morgan and Morris, 1999). Language wears on its
face a representational complexion. Pragmatists want to argue that this complexion is no
more than skin-deep—not a reliable guide to underlying function and structure—but the case
is much easier to make if we start further from the surface.
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say about the users of such models? How should we model such creatures, in
our meta-models? There are two crucial points. First, the modelled creatures
need to be modelled as representers—creatures whose modelling aims to ‘mirror’
some aspect of the world they inhabit. Second, their use of models of probability
has to be seen as attempting to represent in this way—the models themselves
must have a representational function. (The second point serves to rule out
the case of users who, while representers in other ways, use their probabilistic
models for some non-representational purpose.)
2.2 Subjectivist models
An alternative view is that in modelling probabilities our aim is to model psy-
chological states—credences—to some feature of which the probability calculus
is applicable, at least under idealisation. At least in a loose sense, then, this view
holds that when we model probabilities, we model something subjective—some
feature of our own minds.
What meta-models are appropriate in this case? As in the objectivist case,
the modelled creatures need to be modelled as representers, whose modelling
aims to mirror some aspect of the world they inhabit. In this case, however, the
feature represented is part of their own psychology. Inter alia, then, they need
to be creatures with the relevant psychology—creatures with credences. Note
that this wasn’t necessary in the objectivist case. If probabilities are part of
mind-independent reality, then in principle creatures without credences ought
to be able to model them, even if the part of reality thereby modelled needs to
be characterised in terms of its relevance for creatures who do have credences.
A detailed subjectivist meta-model may be expected to tell us, among other
things, how the relevant psychological states vary with perceived features of
the creatures’ external environment. (We’re assuming here that the function
of probabilistic models isn’t just navel-gazing—somehow, that self-descriptive
psychological modelling has some wider point.) Presumably such things as ob-
served relative frequencies will be relevant at this point. But if subjectivism
is to retain its main advantage over objectivism—that of avoiding the meta-
physical and epistemological ‘queerness’ of modal facts, in favour of something
commonplace, though psychological—these features had better be non-modal.
One point to emphasise. In the sense in which I’m using the term, sub-
jectivist models of probability are ‘self-descriptive’. They are models of the
credences of an agent—of the user of the model, in fact, or some idealisation
of the user. It is important to note that not all so-called subjectivist accounts
of probability need be subjectivist in this sense. Some may be closer to the
perspectival view I’m about to describe. And some, perhaps, may simply fail
to distinguish between the two options.
2.3 Perspectival models
The third possibility is that what we model when we model probabilities is
neither some mind-independent aspect of reality, nor an aspect of our own
psychology, but rather the world ‘as it looks’ from the standpoint of such a
credence-based psychology—we model a ‘projection’ from such a psychology.
Of course, more needs to be said to make this notion precise. I’ve just used two
metaphors, one visual and one projective. These are neither obviously compati-
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ble, nor the only ones in play in this area. Later I’ll introduce a third metaphor
and say something about each, and their connections.
For the moment, however, we have enough to note some important points
about the meta-model associated with this perspectival conception of first-order
models. On the one hand, it has something significant in common with the
subjectivist case, in that the users modelled in our meta-model need to be
endowed with credences. On the other hand, there is something important that
differs compared to both the previous cases, in that the users are not modelled
as representers. The function of their first-order models is not representational.
One question we might appeal to meta-models to address is that of the
utility of such non-representational models for the users concerned. To address
such a question, we need to include enough ‘environment’ in the model, and
enough detail concerning the users themselves, to explain how such modelling
contributes to the well-being of such a creature in such an environment.2 In
principle this question can be asked in the representational cases, too, of course,
though there we might expect it to have been addressed at a higher level of
generality, rather than specifically with respect to probabilities.3
Thus we have three conceptions of the nature of probabilistic models, and three
associated meta-models of the relation between such models and their users.
This allows us to ask the question, which meta-model best fits us? Notice that
this is an empirical question—a roughly formulated empirical question, to be
sure, but in principle a matter to be investigated by science (indeed, by the
human sciences, for it concerns an aspect of human linguistic behaviour and
psychology).
Suppose it turns out that the perspectival option offers the best answer to
this question. Then it would be seem to be a mistake to regard ‘Are there
really probabilities?’ as itself an empirical question, on a par with ‘Are there
Tasmanian tigers?’ or ‘Are there magnetic monopoles?’ Why? Because to read
the question about probabilities in this way is to presuppose a representationalist
conception of the functions of probabilistic modelling—the conception rejected
in perspectival meta-models. In other words, it is to presuppose that what we
are trying to do with our models of probability is the same kind of thing, roughly
speaking, as we are trying to do with our models of Tasmanian megafauna or
the quantum world, viz., to represent aspects of our external environment.4
In order to address the question as to which meta-model best fits our own
practice, however, we need a better sense of what the perspectival option in-
volves. Our next task is therefore to clarify the notion of a perspectival model.
2Strictly, the perspective admits a range of options at this point. One, for example, is that
the modelling has no particular advantage.
3Though it is relevant here that some standard answers seem inapplicable in some modal
cases, given certain views of the nature of modal facts. There may be a puzzle about why
modal beliefs are useful, for example, if they represent causally isolated possible worlds.
4I think this issue is actually more subtle than I here make it sound, because the con-
trast between representational and non-representational uses of models less clear-cut than
this formulation assumes. However, I think the contrast between the functions of probabilis-
tic modelling and other kinds of scientific modelling survives a more careful formulation.
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3 What is a perspectival model?
Let’s begin with three metaphors for perspectivalism, a visual metaphor, a pro-
jectivist metaphor, and a fictionalist metaphor. By combining elements of these
three metaphors, I want to bring into focus what I take to be the core of an
interesting perspectivalism.
3.1 The visual metaphor
The visual metaphor thinks of a perspective as like an aspect of reality viewed
from a particular standpoint. Here standpoint usually means a spatial standpoint—
what is perspectival is the view from a particular spatial location and orienta-
tion. But in principle it might include aspects of the observer’s ‘location’ in a
more general sense, such as aspects of her visual system. (The view through
rose-coloured spectacles might thus be thought of as a particular perspective, for
example.) This metaphor makes it is easy to see how models can be perspectival.
We just think of a model as containing only what is visible from the viewpoint
in question. Moreover, because the viewpoint in question is straightforwardly
observer-dependent, the metaphor gives us an easy model of dependence on a
contingent feature of an agent’s circumstances—their spatial location, the colour
of their spectacles, and so on.
On the other hand, the visual metaphor suggests that a perspective is merely
an observer-dependent selection from a set of things which are—in themselves,
so to speak—observer-independent. This wouldn’t be true of all versions of this
kind of perspectivalism—it is explicitly not true of Russell’s (1914) construction
of objects from perspectival sensibilia, for example. But where it is true it is
unhelpful. The more interesting cases are ineliminably perspectival, in the sense
that we can’t achieve a non-perspectival description simply by including more.
3.2 The projectionist metaphor
The classic statement of the projectionist metaphor comes from Hume’s distinc-
tion between the operations of reason and taste:
Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and oftaste are
easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and
falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity,
vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in
nature, without addition and diminution: The other has a produc-
tive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural objects with the
colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new
creation. (Hume 1998, 163)
This metaphor has the great advantage, in my view, of calling attention to
distinctive aspects of our psychology, relevant to the perspective in question—
that from which we project, in effect. In the probability case, we know what this
feature is: credence, in its raw or idealised form. But unlike subjectivism proper,
which regards probabilistic models as models of our credences, this approach
regards them as models of the projections of these psychological states—of the
‘objectifications’ of the credences, the ‘new creations’ with which our faculties
gild reality.
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Of course, this remains rather metaphorical, and what it means needs clarifi-
cation. It might be phenomenological, for example, as it seems to be in Hume. It
might be cashed out in more linguistic terms, as the construction of a practice of
making claims and reasoning in ways which ultimately ‘express’ these credences.
Or it might be cashed in the ‘model model’ itself, so that what projection really
amounts to is the construction of models whose ontologies stand in the appro-
priate relationship to the inner states concerned. More on these options later.
(It seems to me likely that the latter two options go hand-in-hand.)
For now, I want to call attention to what seem to me the twin advantages of
the projectionist metaphor. Firstly, in calling attention to a distinctive aspect
of our psychology from which we ‘project’, it identifies a contingent feature of
the speaker that grounds the perspective in question. The identification of such
a feature is absolutely central, in my view, to any interesting perspectivalism
of this kind. Indeed, it is what makes it perspectival, for it is variation with
respect to this ‘contingent ground’ that constitutes variation of perspective.
Note that we shouldn’t assume that the relevant ground will always be psy-
chological. In other cases it might be spatial or temporal location, for example.
Or it might be location on some non-spatiotemporal scale of variability. (Some
crude examples: when we call things hot or cold, tall or short, we are compar-
ing their temperature or height to our own.) Whatever it is, the first important
virtue of the projectionist metaphor is that it emphasises that perspectival mod-
elling is a game creatures are equipped to play, in virtue of the fact that they
possess or occupy the contingent ground in question.
The second virtue of the metaphor is its comparative clarity on the important
issue of what distinguishes perspectivalism from subjectivism. Projection is
coloured by ‘internal sentiment’ (or its analogues in other cases), but it is not a
representation of those internal sentiments.5
Taken together, these two characteristics comprise the core of the most inter-
esting notion of perspective, in my view. On the one hand, perspectival models
(or concepts, or judgements) depend on some contingent feature or ground, pos-
session of which is a precondition of use of the model, concept or judgement in
question. On the other hand, such models, concepts or judgements don’t repre-
sent that feature or ground, explicitly or implicitly. (The contingent ground of
a perspectival judgement is always backgrounded, as we might say.)
3.3 The fictionalist metaphor
This metaphor has the advantage of helping to emphasise that the perspectivity
belongs to the background, not the foreground. From within the perspective
in question, its objects don’t look perspectival. They simply look like objects.
This is obviously the case in fiction—it is (almost always) inappropriate, within
a fictional context, to portray its objects as fictions. Our fictions don’t say,
‘It was a dark and stormy and fictional night’, except occasionally for self-
consciously convention-busting effect. The label ‘fictional’ is imposed from the
5However, more needs to be said at this point about the nature of the distinction—
especially by someone who, like me, is inclined (see, e.g., Price 2004) to deny that there
are any genuine representations, in anything more than a deflationary sense. The distinction
requires careful attention to the relations between models and judgement, and to the differ-
ing assertion and rejection conditions for the judgements associated with self-descriptive and
projective models.
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outside, when we comment on the status of such objects.6
Of course, we don’t want to banish perspectivity for ever. We want to be
able to see it as theorists, for otherwise perspectivalism would have nothing to
say. It gets back in when we ask why a particular fiction should be useful for
these creatures in those circumstances. Perhaps a disadvantage of the fictionalist
metaphor, compared to the projectionist metaphor, is that it does nothing to
direct our attention to this issue. It would be easy to think of all fictions as on
a par, and to fail to notice the ways in which particular fictions may be adapted
to—indeed, dependent on—particular needs and circumstances.
A better stategy is therefore to combine this third metaphor with the second—
to think of projection as production of fictional ontology, riding on the back of
the various psychological and other commonalities that constitute the contingent
grounds of the perspectival models in question. We thus ask, why is it useful for
creatures occupying those grounds to invent such models? (Why ontology? And
why talk of truth?) To make this work, fictionalism needs to have the flexibility
to connect particular aspects of the fictions concerned to the relevant aspects of
the user’s circumstances. Uniquely among all fictions, for example, the fiction
of chances needs to connect with credences in an appropriate way—a way that
looks (from the inside, as it were) like Lewis’s Principal Principle (Lewis 1980).
A further strategic advantage of the fictionalist metaphor is the way in which
it connects with familar views about the functions of theoretical models in sci-
ence. It is already well-recognised that models that are in some sense fictions
may nevertheless play an important role in science. One version of this view
is instrumentalism, which rejects a representationalist conception of the role
of theoretical models altogether. Another version, less radical, recognises an
important role for models embodying fictional idealisations in the context of a
generally realist view of scientific theories. In a sense, my modal perspectivalist
simply wants to give these ideas an extra degree of freedom—to suggest, for
example, that the utility of instrumentalist models is a more complex matter
than usually assumed, and may rely on particular contingent features of the
users of those models, such as the fact that their psychology includes credences.
My view thus compares to a kind of multifunctional fictionalism. Models are
tools, and the kinds of tools we need depends on the kind of creatures we are.
The fictionalist metaphor has one significant disadvantage, from my point
of view. Roughly, it is more anti-realist than it needs to be (or than I want to
be). I’ll return to this point at the end of the paper. Until then, I’m happy to
ride in tandem with fictionalist views.
Summing up, then, we have three guiding metaphors for perspectivalism:
the metaphor of visual perception from a particular viewpoint, the projectivist
metaphor, and the fictionalist metaphor. I’ve suggested that the second and the
6Note that we have a choice about how we put the observer into the fictionalist meta-
model. We can put the observer in the fiction, modelling her as a representer of the objects
which are fictional from our point of view but not from hers. Or we can model her as a user
of (rather than a participant in) the fiction in question. If the meta-model is to represent
ourselves, then clearly the latter approach is the right one—we don’t want to model ourselves
as merely fictional. But the former approach is also useful for some purposes. In particular,
it gives us a way of thinking about what the perspective is like ‘from the inside’—from the
standpoint from which its fictional character is not apparent. How it seems to us is just how
it would seem to those fictional creatures, who perceive real chances. In this case both the
chances and the perceivers of chances are fictions, but fictions which tell us a lot about our
own real phenomenology.
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third are more useful than the first, and all the more so if they are combined,
so that the source of the projection explains the genealogy and utility of the
relevant fictions.
4 Perspectival models in science?
A republican view of causation or probability would agree with Russell that
there is a sense in which these things are not among the constituents of the
world discovered by physics, yet disagree that they should be banished from
science. Republicans contend that despite their human origins, these modal
notions may play a deep role in science. But how could this be? Isn’t science
supposed to reveal the world as it appears ‘from nowhere’, rather than the world
as it appears from some particular human perspective?
Two initial responses to this concern. First, I want to note, but set aside
for time being, the possibility of arguments that there can be no such thing as
a non-perspectival description, a viewpoint genuinely ‘from nowhere’. I set this
aside not because I believe that no such argument is available. (On the contrary,
as I’ll explain.) But our present interest is in the contrast between modal and
non-modal perspectives, and a global argument would be blind to this contrast.
Second, even if there were a view from nowhere, and it were the job of
science to describe it, it might nevertheless be helpful to distinguish between
‘pure’ science, which did just this, and ‘applied’ science, which was allowed to
be perspectival in various ways, in the service of distinctively human interests.
Given such a distinction, it would be a legitimate question whether chance,
causation, and the like fall on one side of it or the other. To understand the
question, we need to be able to bring into focus the perspectival option. In other
words, we need to be at home with the idea of modelling reality as it appears
from some distinctively human perspective.
Again, the probability case is helpful. On the one hand, it is a case in which
the philosophical landscape is sufficiently well-mapped for it to be relatively
uncontroversial that non-objective probabilities have some place in science. On
the other hand, it has enough connections to modality in general to serve as a
gentle introduction to the possibility of a broader perspectivalism.
5 Perspectival probabilities
The analogue of Russell’s claim for the case of objective probability would be
that physics has shown that that are no such things. It is widely believed
that this claim is false, because quantum mechanics has shown that there are
objective probabilities. In the background here, however, is the view that this
analogue of Russell’s claim would have been true, if physics had turned out to be
deterministic; and would still be true, if the right version of quantum theory (or
its successor) turned out to be deterministic (as in Bohm’s theory, for example,
and other no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics). Even now, then,
we should concede that Russell might turn out be right about chances—or so
goes the orthodoxy.
However, it’s not hard to see that the orthodoxy can’t be the last word on
whether probability has a serious role to play in science. It would be a scandal
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if the issue of the legitimacy of uses of probability and probabilistic models
elsewhere in science (and other aspects of everyday life) couldn’t be settled
until we knew whether the final microphysics was deterministic. So all these
other uses of probability need to be explained in some other way.
Let’s put this in terms of meta-models. Recall our three hypotheses from §2
about how we should model our own use of probability. The objectivist meta-
model models us as creatures detecting and representing objective chances—
features of the mind-independent world. The subjectivist meta-model models us
as creatures representing features of our own psychology. And the perspectival
meta-model models us a creatures modelling probabilities in some other non-
representational mode (perhaps fictionally, for example). We know that the first
hypothesis is a bad hypothesis, at least for all the uses of probability which don’t
show the right kind of sensitivity to the question as to whether final physics is
deterministic. That leaves subjectivism or perspectivalism. The choice between
subjectivism and perspectivalism isn’t clear-cut, perhaps, and can’t be, until
perspectivalism is well-understood. So for time being let me lump them together,
and use the term republicanism for both.
Thus the choices that Russell seems to allow in the case of causation—
eliminativism or objectivism—can’t be the only options for science in the case
of probability. In that sense, probabilistic republicanism is not only on the
table but dominates the table, in a way that it takes a perverse fixity of gaze
to fail to see. And once it is seen, it ought to be seen as a threat. Whatever
the right republican story in all the cases insensitive to final physics, what is
to prevent it working in that case, too? After all, whatever it appeals to—our
epistemic situation, for example—is also going to characteristic of the latter
cases, apparently (if anything more so, because of the limits physics places on
our knowledge). So the republicans at the table seem in danger of making the
objectivists redundant.
This redundancy argument could be couched in terms of meta-models. The
relevant comparison would be between (i) a meta-model of idealised epistemic
agents detecting probabilistic states of affairs, which they then connect to rele-
vant features of their own psychology; and (ii) a meta-model of creatures begin-
ning with such a psychology, and such an epistemic situation, and then finding
it useful to construct perspectival models in the appropriate relation to their
psychology. It seems that even an objectivist about probability has to admit
that the second meta-model is appropriate to all those cases, including cases in
science, in which (by the objectivist’s lights) there are no chances. It is hard
to see how an appeal to a combination of simplicity and Occam could fail to
recommend that the second model be applied universally. In other words, it is
doubtful whether science ever needs genuinely objectivist models of probability.7
Perspectivalism has other attractions in this case. Beginning on the psycho-
logical or pragmatic side, it makes easy work of things that are often difficult
for objectivists, viz., accounting for the epistemology and relevance of beliefs
about probability. If there are chances, how can we know about them, and why
does that knowledge have the significance it does for decision?8
It might be objected that there’s a huge countervailing disadvantage. As the
7For an interesting recent argument to a similar conclusion, see Strevens 2003, §5.6. I am
grateful to Adam Elga for calling this to my attention.
8These are sometimes called the problems of upward and downward inference. They are
closely related to what van Fraassen (1989) calls the identification and application problems.
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objectivist might put it:
What about the probabilities in quantum mechanics? Surely you’re
not going to claim that those are perspectival? What could be less
perspectival than quantum mechanics—which, after all, is surely the
best candidate we have for an account of what the world looks like
‘from God’s perspective’, or ‘from nowhere’?
For my part, I’m happy to bite this bullet. I’m happy to accept that at least as
standardly formulated, quantum mechanics embodies a perspectival description,
a description tailored to (an idealised version of) our own perspective—that of
creatures needing to predict and act for an uncertain future, on the basis of
knowledge of the past. In particular, I think that this is the right way to think
of the probabilities in quantum mechanics.
‘But then what is reality really like?’, my opponent might ask. At this point,
there are a number of options. One would be to argue that the question is in
any case impossible to answer, for familiar reasons. It’s a familiar idea, accepted
by many realists,9 that we know the world only under some structural descrip-
tion. But what goes into a structural description? If structure is always inter
alia modal structure10—if we know reality only in its causal and dispositional
aspects—and modal properties are perspectival in the way I’m suggesting, then
accepting that quantum mechanics is perspectival in this way is not a reason for
thinking of it as second-rate, compared to some achievable but less perspectival
theory.
The realist opponents I have in mind don’t think that causal and disposi-
tional properties are perspectival, of course. My point is that they can hardly
object that a perspectival view of the modal properties on the grounds that it
leaves us cut off from the world in itself, because they too think we are thus
cut off. So if I had to live with the conclusion that we could know nothing
not ‘tainted’ with modal perspectivity, I could do so. And I’d have some near
neighbours in the realist camp.
In fact, however, I’m a little more optimistic. I think it’s possible that
by thinking about the kind of world that would ‘look like quantum mechanics’
from the perspective of creatures embedded in spacetime in the way that we are,
we have some sort of handle on the project of constructing a less perspectival
successor theory to quantum mechanics. The theoretical stance needed here is
the one provided by meta-modelling: a viewpoint sensitive both to the nature of
9See Langton 1988 and Lewis, forthcoming—and also Worrall 1989, Zahar 1996, Ladyman
1998, French 1998 and French and Ladyman 2003, for similar views in the philosophy of
science. Although all these authors agree, roughly speaking, that we know the world only in
its structural aspects, French and Ladyman differ from the others in thinking, in effect, that
structure is all there—that fundamental ontology lies at the structural level. In their version,
then, there is no world from which knowledge of structure alone leaves us cut off, but nor,
therefore, is there any room for the present objection to my modal perspectivalism. From my
point of view, then, the two versions of this structuralist view are equally useful.
10Cf. this recent characterisation of structural realism by French and Ladyman:
[T]here is a minimal metaphysical commitment that we think structural realism
ought to entail. This is that there are mind independent modal relations between
phenomena (both possible and actual), but these relations are not supervenient
on the properties of unobservable objects and the external relations between
them, rather this structure is ontologically basic. (2003, 45–46, my emphasis)
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the world and to the nature of the creatures who inhabit that world, in order to
address the question as to why those creatures should model that world in this
way—i.e., the way exemplified by quantum mechanics, as we have it today.11
For me, then, the appeal to quantum probabilities in support of objectivism
cuts neither ice nor mustard. As I’ve already noted, I think the appeal of
objectivism about probability in science rests, at best, on a rather blinkered
view of the options. In a more extended treatment of these issues, I’d back up
that assessment by appealing to more local arguments for subjectivism about
quantum probabilities. For example, Jenann Ismael (1996) argues that the
common assumption that quantum probabilities are intrinsic physical properties
is incompatible with many standard views of the nature of chance—in particular,
those views which allow that the chance of an event at a time supervenes on the
history of the world at later times. If we give up supervenience to avoid this
conflict, we inflate our metaphysics at the cost of our epistemology. In effect,
we worsen the problems noted earlier of explaining and justifying upward and
downward inference to chances. (As Ismael (1996, 89) puts it, ‘the injection of
metaphysics . . . goes against empiricist inclinations’.)
Ismael goes on to suggest that an injection of subjectivism offers a much bet-
ter prognosis. I agree, and I think the point generalises. In general, perspectival
models of probability—which provide a better way of introducing subjectivity
than the self-descriptive subjectivist models we considered in §2—make easy
work of things that are difficult for objectivist approaches. In particular, they
avoid the epistemological and pragmatic problems mentioned earlier—How can
we know about chances, and why do they have the relevance they do for de-
cision? And they do well in explaining other oddities of chance, such as its
apparent time-asymmetry.
What happens to the analogue of Russell’s claim for the case of probability,
if we accept this perspectival account of the probabilities in quantum theory and
elsewhere? Two essential points. First, Russell is right in thinking that there
are no chances objectively construed. But second, he is wrong to think that talk
of probabilities only passes muster because we fail to see what is wrong with it.
What he misses is the republican option. Probability passes muster as a notion
we ourselves bring to our models of the world—a possibility that requires that
we see ourselves as Kant does, as conceptual creators, not as mere consumers
of conceptual categories pre-packaged by God.
6 Modelling modalisers
I said at the beginning that I wanted to use probability as guide to the general
case, including causation. I don’t have space here to try to provide details,
but it should be clear how the program goes. We aim for a meta-model of a
modal agent—a creature embedded in time, from whose epistemological and
decision-theoretic perspective, modal talk makes sense.
In the case of causation, as I noted at the beginning, an attractive idea is
that the agent’s perspective is crucial. This idea has appealed to many people,
11When I’m very optimistic, I think that the answer might point to a theory less puzzling
than quantum mechanics itself, from a realist’s point of view. If so, then the satisfying moral
would be that excessive realism about modal notions had actually stood in the way of a
satisfactory realist interpretation of quantum phenomena.
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one of the first of them Ramsey. As Ramsey puts it, ‘from the situation when
we are deliberating seems to . . . arise the general difference of cause and effect.’
(1929, 146) In order to make good this idea, our task as meta-modellers is to
show how modelling the world in causal terms serves the interests of creatures
we model as abstract agents, embedded in a non-causal environment. (In other
words, we don’t include causation in the model environment of the creatures
represented in our meta-model, but the meta-model aims to show how it is
useful for these creatures to include it in their models.)
Two further comments. First, as I’ve argued elsewhere (Price 1991, 1992a,
1992b, 1996, 2001), one of the striking advantages of this perspectival approach
to causation is that offer a coherent account of the origins of the asymmetry and
temporal orientation of causation. Roughly, it is a projection of our own tempo-
ral asymmetry as agents—again, this is something we could use our meta-models
to make more precise. As in the probability case, abandoning objectivism for
perspectival thus offers light work in place of heavy weather.
In fairness to Russell, it should be noted that he himself is clearly aware
of some of the relevant considerations here. In discussing the origins of our
intuition that the past is fixed and the future open, he says that ‘there seems no
doubt that the main difference in our feelings arises from the accidental fact that
the past but not the future can be known by memory.’ (1913, 203) We might
quibble about the way Russell expresses this. Roughly, it is only accidental
that the past and not the future can be known by memory if we interpret the
terms as rigid designators, picking out the same temporal direction in worlds
in which our own physical orientation is reversed. It is plausible that in that
imagined case, we would still use the term ‘past’ to pick out the direction we
remembered. But that semantic point aside, Russell is evidently aware of one
of the key contingencies about us, which seems bound to play centre-stage in
an explanation of the modal perspective.
The second comment is that there is no reason to be troubled by the fact
that in conducting these investigations—in thinking about the usefulness of
causal and modal notions for creatures like us—we are employing those very
modal notions. For example, we are thinking about how our lives would be, if
we didn’t employ counterfactual reasoning. But this circularity is surely not
vicious. On the contrary, it simply serves to confirm that there is little or no
interesting science that is free of perspective, in the deep sense associated with
the modal categories. If it is science itself that reveals this to us, how are
objectivists to respond? By claiming that in this respect science is not to be
trusted, and that philosophy offers deeper insights?
7 Why I am not a fictionalist
I noted earlier that although the perspectival viewpoint could usefully be com-
pared to fictionalism, I wanted to distinguish my own version of the view from
fictionalism. The easiest way to explain this point is to explain the analo-
gous distinction between my view and orthodox noncognitivism or quasirealism
(Blackburn 1993), and then transpose.
A noncognitivist or quasirealist typically makes two claims about the func-
tions of the target discourse—evaluative language, for example. One claim
is positive, the other negative. The negative claim says that the terms or
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statements characteristic of the discourse lack some semantic property. They
are non-referential, non-truthconditional, non-descriptive, non-factual, or some-
thing of the kind. The positive claim offers an alternative account of their func-
tions of the language in question—for example, that it expresses, or projects
from, evaluative attitudes. Thus we might say that the negative claim is anti-
representational, the positive claim expressivist.
My version of expressivism keeps the positive claim and throws away the neg-
ative claim. As I have argued elsewhere (Price 2004), this combination seems
obligatory if we are deflationists about the relevant semantic notions. For to
be a semantic deflationist is to believe, inter alia, that semantic notions play
no substantial theoretical role. If that’s true, such notions can’t play a sub-
stantial role in the characterisation of a philosophical position, and the negative
claim must be empty of theoretical content. Contrary to received wisdom, then,
semantic minimalism is a friend and not an enemy of expressivism.
In other words, ignoring a few bells and whistles, semantic deflationism
commits us to a kind of global expressivism. Why? Because without substantial
semantic notions to underpin representationalism—to underpin the claim that
some discourses are ‘genuinely’ realist, or factual, or cognitive, or whatever—all
that’s left to us as linguistic theorists are non-representational accounts of the
functions of those discourses. What’s left to us, in other words, are the kinds
of accounts that noncognitivists and quasirealists have offered locally, in telling
the positive part of their story. (Again, all of this could be cast in the terms
of meta-models. There, the point is that if representation is not a substantial
theoretical notion, perspectival meta-models are all that we have left.)
So am I a quasirealist? Yes, in one sense, for I endorse the quasirealist’s
project of explaining why expressively-grounded talk takes what are usually
seen as realist forms—why it is treated as truth-apt, for example. But no, in
another sense, for in endorsing this project globally, I reject the view that there
is any bit of declarative language for which this is not the appropriate theoretical
perspective. Hence, in effect, in claiming that there is nothing else, I reject the
basis for the label ‘quasi’.
In one of his late papers (Lewis 2004), David Lewis argues that quasirealism
is essentially fictionalism. I agree, more or less. If there is a difference, it is that
in the case of fictionalism the negative claim is more naturally cast in ontolog-
ical rather than semantic terms. Instead of saying with the quasirealist that
evaluative talk is non-referential, the fictionalist may say simply that there are
no values. But in this case I distinguish myself from fictionalism just as before,
except that the necessary deflationism is ontological, rather than semantic. I
think that if, with Carnap (1952), we reject the idea of an ontological stand-
point external to our linguistic practices, then there is no viewpoint from which
we can properly say that there are no values. Of course, the Carnapian point
cuts the other way, too. There is no distinctively philosophical viewpoint from
which we can say that there are values. What we are left with is a kind of inter-
nal, minimal realism, combined once again with a global expressivist standpoint
(which is where all the interesting theoretical work takes place).
Note that Carnap does not require that we reject the fictional–non-fictional
distinction altogether. On the contrary, as one of his own examples illustrates.
Discussing what he calls ‘the thing world’—‘the spatio-temporally ordered sys-
tem of observable things and events’ (1952, 210)—he says:
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Once we have accepted this thing-language and thereby the frame-
work of things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., ‘Is
there a white piece of paper on my desk’, ‘Are unicorns . . . real or
merely imaginary’, and the like. These questions are answered by
empirical investigations. (1952, 210)
So Carnap is happy to allow us to distinguish fictional unicorns from real wom-
bats or extinct Tasmanian tigers. However, he stresses that ‘from these [legiti-
mate, internal ontological] questions we must distinguish the external question
of the reality of the thing world itself’. He notes that this is the kind of question
metaphysicians take themselves to be addressing, but argues that
it cannot be solved because it is framed in the wrong way. To be
real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the framework;
hence this concept cannot meaningfully be applied to the framework
itself . . . The thesis of the reality of the thing world . . . cannot be
formulated in the thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical
language. (1952, 210–211)
Among the metaphysical positions thus disallowed is a global fictionalism
about the entities of the thing-world. And similarly in the modal case, it seems
to me: Carnap’s view is quite compatible with local kinds of fictionalism about
causation, chance, and the like. It allows us to say that the causes and probabil-
ities that occupy Sherlock Holmes’ attention are as fictional as the man himself.
What is excluded is global fictionalism about the entire causal or probabilis-
tic framework, of the kind advocated by those who call themselves fictionalists
about causes, chance and modality.
Within the philosophy of science, a useful comparison for the resulting po-
sition is with Arthur Fine’s deflationary realism, encapsulated in what he calls
the Natural Ontological Attitude (Fine, 1984). With one crucial qualification,
Fine’s souped-down realism suits my modal perspectivalist very well. The qual-
ification is that there is one respect in which my view is very much less quietist
than Fine’s—one respect in which it envisages an important role for philosophy,
albeit not the traditional metaphysical role. This concerns the recognition that
different models may do very different work for us, being projections from very
different contingent grounds. But the standpoint from which we draw such dis-
tinctions is not that of a traditional ontologist or metaphysician (opponents I
share with Fine). It is that of the psychologist, the linguistic and the anthro-
pologist, reflecting on aspects of human thought and behaviour.
Summing up, then, these are my reasons for distinguishing my view from
fictionalism. Like non-cognitivism, fictionalism makes two claims about the
function of the talk in question, a positive claim and a negative claim. I re-
ject the negative claim—whether couched in semantic or ontological terms—on
deflationist grounds. Deflationism thus leaves me without the theoretical vocab-
ulary or standpoint required to say that the talk is question is fictional. What’s
left, by default, is a kind of minimal realism—though a pluralistic realism, which
insists that different models may do different kinds of jobs.
15
8 Meta-models and metaphysics?
In distinguishing my view from fictionalism, I’ve relied on a deflationary attitude
to metaphysics. But it might be argued that meta-models provide what we need
to reinflate things—to draw the distinction between cases in which realism is
appropriate and cases in which it is not. Haven’t I myself suggested as much, in
effect, by noting that in the case of modality, we don’t need to put modal facts
in the modelled environment, in order to explain the modal talk of creatures
modelled in our meta-models of modallisers?
This is an important objection, which needs more detailed treatment than
I can give it here. Briefly, I think that although we can usefully highlight
degrees of perspectivalism in this way, there is no non-perspectival view at
the end of the tunnel. The most persuasive argument for this conclusion, in
my view, is that the phenomenon of generality in language always supplies an
ingredient which we don’t need in the modelled environment, in order to account
for linguistic practice. Models and theories are always tools we plan to apply in
new cases. That’s why we have them, as implements with which better to face
an unknown future. At any given stage, however, we don’t need those unknown
cases, in order to account for the models, concepts or theories we currently
possess. All models, concepts and theories thus reach beyond what we need in
the environment, to explain the fact that we possess them. And nothing counts
as genuinely representational, if this is our test.12
It is worth noting that even if the proposed test did succeed in distinguish-
ing a class of non-perspectival models, it is far from clear that the result would
necessarily count as realism. Another possibility, apparently, would be a kind
of two-dimensional instrumentalism. Imagine that all scientific language is con-
strued instrumentally, in something like van Fraassen’s (1981) sense. That is,
the only relevant epistemic attitude is what van Fraassen calls acceptance, not
belief. (Perhaps we have decided that there are no genuine beliefs, in van
Fraassen’s sense, on the grounds that we are semantic deflationists.) Within
this instrumentalism, there might then be a place for an additional, orthogonal
dimension in which models and theories could count as instruments—the dimen-
sion associated with perspectivalism (and the idea that particular conceptual
instruments have specialised functions, related to particular needs and capaci-
ties). The upshot would be that even if some model and theories were entirely
non-perspectival, and hence had no second-dimensional instrumental role, they
would remain instrumental in the original sense. Realism would remain out of
reach.
9 Conclusion
I’ve suggested that the vocabulary of theoretical models provides a helpful vehi-
cle for pragmatist approaches to the modal notions in science, as to other topics.
The value of models is that they tend naturally to bring the foreground the issues
of function, use and role in practice, on which pragmatists want to focus—and
12This argument is closely related to the claim that the Wittgensteinian rule-following
considerations provide an argument for global non-factualism—that is, they reveal a dimension
of perspectival contingency which is ineliminable from language. See Price 1988, 1998 and
Pettit 1991 for views of this kind.
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at the same time (what’s really the other side of the same coin) downplay the
na¨ıve representationalism that pragmatists see as such an impediment to good
philosophy.
Using this model vocabulary, I’ve tried to delineate the kind of perspectival-
ism I take to be particularly promising in the modal case, and perhaps especially
in the causal case. It is this kind of perspectivalism that I take to provide the
best template for an account of causation in terms of agency and manipulation.
While I haven’t said enough, probably, to convince the two groups of oppo-
nents I mentioned at the beginning—those who agree about the importance of
manipulation but want to think of it in more objectivist terms, and those who
disagree about manipulation altogether—I hope I have made it clearer what
the argument is all about. I hope I’ve also established that the debate about
causation connects with much broader issues, in several directions—about other
species of modality employed in science, for example, and about the range of
options for a philosophical account of any such notion. In particular, while I
may not have converted anyone to causal republicanism, I do think I’ve shown
that it belongs on the philosophical map.13
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